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The aim of this article is to identify the presence of knowledge transfer and spillover effects 
and investigate the mechanism in which they materialise through efficiency and performance 
gained resulting from two foreign banks’ majority and minority ownership in the South African 
banking (SA) sector. To achieve these objectives, performance and efficiency indicators of 
ABSA and the Standard Bank are collected and computed using t-statistics model. The results 
are analysed in light of interview outputs with several SA banking actors. The findings suggest 
that not only these two banks became more efficient after foreign participation in their 
ownership structure, but also the level of knowledge transfer depends on the type of ownership. 
In addition, the emergence of Capitec bank, a relatively new player in the SA banking sector 
contributed to the competition effect in the segment of retail-baking whereas the new entity 
Barclays/ABSA, a majority FDI, became a catalyst to competition effect in the segment of 
investment banking.  
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1. Introduction 
In an emerging market, will a domestic bank performance improve after a change in ownership, 
and will this performance be better than those of their peers? What are the factors that provide 
improvement in performance and/or efficiency and how these changes benefit the entire 
banking sector? Before authorising an acquisition, these are some questions usually asked by 
government and financial regulators on one hand, and professional of finance on the other, who 
would want to see a return on their investment. In addition, operations of acquisition also called 
majority Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) or minority FDI by foreign banks in emerging 
markets is a way of generating transfer of knowledge that could materialise through better 
performance and/or efficiency of the acquired domestic bank. These aspects of knowledge 
diffusion are even greater in importance when an FDI take place in a in developing economy, 
first because the banking sector play an important role in the process of the country 
development and second, a FDI could be a catalyst for competition, which in turn could help 
modernise the entire banking industrial sector and regulation that would make it more efficient.  
It is important to distinguish between Knowledge transfer and knowledge spillover 
(also called spillover effect in the banking sector). Knowledge spillover could be considered 
as  knowledge created by one firm, and in our case a multinational bank (MNB), that is used 
by a second local host country bank with no full compensation to the use of that knowledge 
(Javocik, 2004b), in other word there is no type of contract between the MNB and domestique 
banks that authorises this transfer of knowledge (Chang, and Xu, 2008). In contrast, knowledge 
transfer is a voluntarily diffusion of knowledge from one MNB to the another MNB (Smeets, 
2009). Both knowledge spillover and knowledge transfer are characterised by improved 
technology, financial returns, labour productivity and some other measures of productivity 
(Bosco, 2001). In addition, job increases, and knowledge transfer are benefits that are created 
through inward FDIs.  
The literature on FDI knowledge spillover is well developed in the manufacturing 
sector and focuses essentially in geographical areas that comprise US, Europe and more 
recently Asia, Japan and Australia. However, in the banking sector the literature on spillover 
effect (knowledge spillover) is still at a relatively embryonic stage (Herrero and Simon, 2003). 
Furthermore, in Africa, there are limited empirical studies in the banking sector due to the 
scarcity of available data, and as the banking sector is embracing a new generation of 
internationalisation (Okeahalam, 2008) more studies are needed at firm level. These studies 
could enrich the theory on spillover effects as FDI not only take place between developed and 
developing countries but also more and more amongst developing countries, and this study 
illustrates this perfectly. No doubt those lessons learnt will benefit law makers in designing 
new policies, which not only encourage more FDI to provide economic benefit but also prevent 
from systemic financial risks or “cut and run” behaviour that consists of banks leaving the 
country at the first sign of economic or political trouble. In addition, additional studies on 
knowledge spillover in the banking sector can help practitioners evaluate the potential cost-
benefit of the destination for their financial investments.  
This article provides different important contributions. The first contribution is the 
current context when in 2017 Barclays reduced its participation to 24% into ABSA after 
acquiring a majority share in 2005, and in 2007 ICBC bought 20% minority share of the SASB. 
Since these two acquisitions, no major FDI in the SA banking sector has yet been recorded so 
far, making the context more relevant with a need for more lessons to be learnt especially 
following Barclays divestment. This SA case study comprises the big four (big 4) that 
represents 80% of SA banking sector total assets. They are Amalgamated Banks of South 
Africa (ABSA), the Standard Bank (SASB), Nedbank and FirstRand as well as a SA more 
recent and smaller player Capitec that has been showing rapid growth. Two deals took place, 
one in 2005 between Barclays, a British-based bank, and ABSA and the other one in 2007 
between Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), a Chinese based-bank, and the 
Standard Bank. Studying these two important acquisitions since the re-entry of many foreign 
banks after the end of apartheid regime in SA in 1994, represents a unique opportunity to 
evaluate knowledge diffusion through the prism of majority and minority FDIs. With ABSA 
and SASB weighting more than 40% of SA banking market in terms of total assets, and their 
size and market share being the kind of acquisitions most likely to yield efficiency gains, there 
is no doubt that studying these acquisitions in the framework of knowledge diffusion and 
spillover effects could be considered a significant contribution. In addition, this context of 
Barclays divestment in ABSA in 2017 (just 12 years only after its major acquisition in SA in 
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis followed by a global economic slowdown), and China 
as an increasing new global player in banking and services sectors, make this case study even 
more relevant for policy makers to assess the real benefits these FDIs brought not only to 
ABSA and SASB but also to the entire SA banking sector and reflect more broadly on banking 
sector FDIs policy.  
Providing empirically the mechanism in which transfer of knowledge and spillover 
effects take place constitutes the second contribution of this article. In emerging and transition 
economies a significant number of studies shows not only the superiority of foreign banks in 
terms of performance when compared to domestic banks but also how foreign banks entry and 
Foreign investment can become a factor of economic development of the domestic banking 
sector (Levine, 1996; Weill, 2003; Walter and Gray, 1983; Denizer, 2000; Goldberg et al., 
2000; Bonin et al., 2005a, 2005b; Berger et al., 2009; Claessens, and Van Horen, 2014;). 
Usually, to detect spillover effect, studies from the literature usually associate increase in 
volume of FDI and improvement of domestic firm performance arguing that this positive 
relation implies evidence for knowledge spillover.  
A third contributions this study offers is to fill in the gap in the existing literature first 
in terms of majority and minority FDIs and second, in terms of emerging economies in 
particular Africa. While this aspect of ownership level is well documented in the industry, the 
literature in banking sector tends to distinguish more between foreign, domestic, private and 
state ownerships. However, recent studies (Berger et al., 2007; Qin, 2008) tend to associate 
minority ownership FDI but they are usually limited to China due to the gradual liberalization 
of its financial sector after its WTO ascension in 2001. Examining spillover effects associated 
specifically to FDI ownership level contributes to the validation of some existing findings from 
the industry as well as to the gathering of evidence from a banking sector perspective and in a 
different geographic location. Moreover, the literature in banking in Africa is still at some 
embryonic stage (Herrero and Simon, 2003) and as more African banks are becoming more 
internationalized, more studies are needed at banks level. This study provides an interesting 
view of the most powerful African banking sector. 
This paper uses a methodology of case studies rather than cross-section or panel data 
statistical models and focuses on 7 banks. Therefore, generalising from the findings to all 
similar foreign participation or acquisition cases will not be possible. But our findings from 
case study provides interesting indications on several areas such as: the conditions of FDI in 
an emerging economy banking sector that may or may not lead to efficiency yield and 
performance gains; the role of ownership differences plays in determining level of efficiency 
and/or performance; and the existence of knowledge transfer and spillover effects and how 
they materialise. In this article, section 2 provides a brief summary of transfer of knowledge 
and spillover effects, then section 3 presents and describes the research design while section 4 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Spillover effects in developing countries banking sector 
Interest for emerging, transition and developing economies banking sectors has grown 
significantly during the last decade and elements such as population density and simultaneous 
openness to trade and capital promote banking sector development (Aluko and Adebayo Ajayi, 
2018). But, since the 2007-08 financial crisis, there are some growing concerns over credit 
funding activities that could potentially increase fragility of the banking sector (Guarin and 
Lozano, 2017) that cannot be ignored despite increase of FDI in the banking sector of emerging 
economies. This is becoming even more acute in the current economic downturn that is 
looming in the aftermath of the current global pandemic due to Covid19. Nevertheless, there 
are still some economic benefits associated with FDI and firm entry that the literature defines 
as knowledge spillover (or spillover effects in the banking sector) that can take the forms of 
improved technologies, financial returns and labour productivities (Bosco, 2001). For 
knowledge to spillover, the literature in the industry sector considers three channels: vertical 
linkages, worker mobility and demonstration effects (Smeets, 2009), whereas, in the banking 
sector some studies focus on the channels of spillover effects of foreign bank entry which are 
competition effect, demonstration effects and labour turnover in which foreign banks entry 
may affect domestic banks (Lensink and Hermes, 2004 and Li, Xu and Yuan, 2014).   
Under competition pressure organisations will adjust their behaviour. In our case 
competition effect occurs when after entering in domestic market, foreign MNBs such as 
Barclays or ICBC by acquiring control of the domestic banks ABSA and SASB may transfers 
their ownership-specific advantages including management competencies, practices and 
procedures to ensure their subsidiaries competitiveness (Uiboupin, 2005). As a consequence, 
the domestic (local) banks facing global competition will improve efficiency through 
technological transfer, and efficiency allocation BIS (2004), and will enhance innovation by 
introducing new products in the markets or process to ensures cost reduction (Yang and Meyer, 
2015). It is also likely that competition may encourage domestic banks to increase the variety 
of financial services (Li, Xu and Yuan, 2015) or develop other products for specific customer 
segments. Furthermore, under the competitive pressure, domestic banks could lower operating 
cost and interest rate margins as well as profits (Hermes and Lensink, 2001). In our case, 
assuming that ABSA and the Standard Bank (the foreign branches) use outdated practices and 
technology, low managerial skills and provide undifferentiated products and services, they may 
both benefit from transfer of knowledge from respectively Barclays and ICBC (the foreign 
banks) to adopt modern practices and technology. Consequently, they might perform better and 
increase the pressure on other competitors, such as Nedbank and First Rand (the domestic/local 
banks) forcing them to increase efficiency that allows them to keep market share and profits. 
A competitive environment could provide incentive to managers to increase bank performance 
in order to survive. 
Demonstration effect occurred when the local firms imitate or reverse engineer MNEs’ 
products and/or practices (Saggi, 2002) as usually, a high level of organisations knowledge 
resides in product and services (Argote, 2013). Thus, demonstration effect might be the most 
obvious channel of knowledge flow to domestic MNEs (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). This 
definition from the industry sector is also very relevant for the banking sector because foreign 
MNBs may introduce new services, modern and more efficient banking techniques, which 
might be new to the domestic banks. Subsequently and under competitive pressure, these 
domestic banks may be compelled to develop these services and improve the efficiency of the 
financial system. In order to achieve these new objectives, domestic banks might be tempted 
to adopt or copy these modern banking techniques (Lensink and Hermes, 2004). However, the 
domestic banks may not be entirely convinced of the benefits and costs and might become 
reluctant to invest in some of the new services, products, systems and practices finding them 
too costly and risky. But if foreign banks/branches demonstrate the viability of this new 
investment then domestic banks would be encouraged to adopt these new banking practices 
and techniques (Meyer, 2004).  
Labour (or employee) turnover from foreign to domestic banks can be seen as one of 
the most important mechanisms that allows management and technical skills to be transferred 
(McKendrick, 1994) as human resources represent a key factor of competitive advantage for a 
bank (Fung, 2008). This assumes that employees’ turnover flows from foreign branches to 
domestic banks. When entering in the foreign subsidiary skilled employees and bank managers, 
usually expatriate staff at the beginning of entry, participate in the propagation of skills and 
knowledge, and the local labour force gets access to international know-how (Hemmer, 2002). 
Therefore, the movement of employees who gain new competences through training and 
education in foreign banks will be able to disseminate codified practices and participate in the 
diffusion of tacit knowledge in local banks (Fu, 2012).   
However, labour turnover can flow in the opposite direction consisting of having local 
(domestic) employees who are then employed by MNBs. The reason is that local employees 
possess better knowledge of the local market. Thus, the MNBs will ensures that these local 
employees get training (Lehner and Schnitzer, 2008). As Foreign banks invest in training 
schemes for new employees as well as local ones, a mechanism of turnover implies that local 
employees would benefit from the foreign managers knowledge and the training scheme. 
Therefore, employees/bankers from local banks will assimilate the practices and retain the 
skills when they move back to domestic banks (Mathieson and Roldos, 2000). This human 
capital improvement will result in reducing operation costs and more efficient banking 
practices.  
Training programmes can be considered as an important competitiveness factor of a 
bank, for the identification and the exploitation of market opportunities and for the ability to 
cope with geographic and technological changes in competitive markets (Bacom, 1998). 
Specific skills as well as human capital contribute to collect and process information about 
borrowers. Thus, the foreign bank participates to the enhancement of its subsidiary 
management specifically when the foreign bank team is directly involved in the domestic 
management team (Lensink and Hermes, 2004). Spillover effects may materialise when foreign 
employees (managers or/and bankers) leave their foreign banks employer for domestic banks. 
Most studies in the banking sectors use efficiency measures and competition effect to 
justify a possible spillover effect linked to presence of foreign banks (Claessens, Demirgüc-
Kunt, and Huizinga, 2001; Berger et al., 2004; Micco et al., 2007; Zhus 2012; Ghos 2016. 
However et al., (2014) are amongst the very few who explicitly use some components taking 
from the channels of spillover effects (employee turnover and competition) and compare 
domestic banks performance before and after foreign investments to investigate spillover effect 
in the Chinese banking sector, and this is the approach this study has taken and adapted to 
investigate spillover effects and transfer of knowledge in SA banking sector. 
Beside the channels of spillover effects, multinational heterogeneity such as the level 
of ownership could also be a determining factor of knowledge spillovers and knowledge 
transfer, as explicit and tacit knowledge could be passed on from local (foreign) branches to 
domestic banks. Tacit knowledge, in particular is difficult to transfer (Reagans and McEvily, 
2003) because of the channels of transfer that are represented by close observation, 
demonstration, experience and face to face contact (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995; Cavusgil, Calantone, Zhao, 2003). Moreover, when firm 1 transfers tacit knowledge to 
firm 2, this consequently improves firm 2 competitive position as the tacit knowledge 
contributes to the decrease of firm 2 costs (Ghosh and Morita, 2017). Therefore, equity 
ownership that can have different level (majority or minority) plays critical role in facilitating 
the transmission of tacit knowledge (Mowery et al.,1996). 
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While the literature seems to be more abundant in the industry sector, in the banking and 
financial sector studies are more limited. When studying multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
FDI, Demelis and Louri (2002) find majority ownership leads to spillovers when measured as 
labour productivity improvements, and minority ownership is likely to produce knowledge 
spillovers. Jarvocik and Spartareaunu (2008) find spillovers from their studies. However, 
Javorcik (2004b) work finds no evidence of spillovers and no statistical difference between 
minority and majority FDI. These results demonstrate the ambiguity or the inconclusiveness of 
predicting any outcomes of knowledge spillover as a function of ownership. The same 
ambiguity seems to exist in the banking sector literature, while studies from (Papi and 
Revoltella, 1999) suggest that majority ownership is necessary for a positive effect on costs 
efficiency, other studies on bank ownership in China find that minority foreign ownership is 
associated with significant increase of efficiency (Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2007; Laurenceson 
and Qin, 2008; Chunxia, Yao, Shujie and Feng, Genfu, 2013; Li, Li, Lei and Huang, 2015). 
 
 
2.2 A Brief background of foreign banks in South Africa 
Before the 1980s, time when the apartheid regime was not yet in place, the SA financial sector 
was dominated by British and Netherlands banks and was strong due to the SA industrialisation 
based on mining and gold, which attracted enormous level of capital. SA financial sector was 
at that time well integrated into the international economy and very specialised in areas such 
as credit and risk management, corporate and structure finance and this legacy continues even 
today making SA financial sector strong by developing country standards (Gelb, 2010). The 
high level of capital from mining and gold activities was channelled via the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) created in 1887, which still remains today amongst the top 20 stock exchanges 
worldwide by market capitalisation (JSE, 2019). From 1980s many foreign banks started to 
leave SA for political reasons to start a re-entry in 1995 after the end of apartheid regime in 
1994.  
As a consequence, foreign banks started to expand their operations in SA, and 
simultaneously, domestic banks increased their presence in foreign countries that saw an 
internationalisation of SA banks. To illustrate this trend of foreign banks re-entry in SA, in 
1994 there were 37 registered domestic banks and mutual banks for only 6 foreign controlled 
banks, however, in 2018 the trend reversed with 18 locally registered banks from which 5 
belongs to foreign banks and 15 registered local branches of foreign banks making all together 
13 domestic banks for 20 foreign controlled banks. But SA banking sector is concentrated with 
only 4 banks (Big 4), namely Standard Bank (SBSA), FirstRand, Nedbank and ABSA that 
dominate the market representing more than 80% of total assets. It was 11 years later in 2005 
after the re-opening of SA banking sector that a major FDI occurred with Barclays taking a 
majority of 51% ownership into ABSA bank. The deal that reached $5.1 was and historical 
event because Barclays, which operated before in SA had to sell its assets after the 
establishment of the Apartheid regime. Subsequently more major FDIs followed when two 
years later, ICBC, a Chinese bank, took a minority ownership into the Standard bank another 
big 4 for approximately the same amount as Barclays’ in ABSA but for only 20% share.   
 
3. A case study approach 
To examine knowledge transfer and spillover effects (equivalent of knowledge spillover used 
in the industry sector), this study identifies efficiency gain and performance improvement from 
indicators of both ABSA and Standard banks. Although this case studies methodology does 
not allow for statistical validation it has however several advantages. First, it provides insights 
into firm (industry) behaviour and performance that cannot be captured in a cross-section 
analysis. Second, in order to support the main theoretical arguments on transfer of knowledge 
and spillover effects this case study gives empirical and anecdotal evidence from a large set of 
data and institutional details taken from sources that are more likely to be unique to the firm or 
industry (interviews, articles and newspapers). And thirdly, the collected details and 
information may be useful for observed behaviour and performance and help identify situations 
to which cross-section generalisations do not apply.  
 
3.1 Description of the dataset  
The data for this study is collected from the annual reports of the SA 4 big banks (ABSA, the 
Standard Bank, First Rand and Nedbank) and Capitec a smaller domestic player. The period of 
study is from 2000 to 2012, five years before the first event of acquisition between Barclays 
and ABSA in 2005 and five years after the second year of foreign minority participation of 
ICBC into the Standard Bank in 2007.  
Most variables of performance and efficiency are expressed as a percentage of total 
assets. It could be argued that level of asset can change over a year therefore it could be more 
appropriate to use yearly average asset, as for instance asset level become more important at 
the end of the year. However, as asset level of SA banks does not fluctuate significantly, and 
for consistency, this study uses assets from end-year for all banks in the panel.   
The first variable is Total expenses to total asset, an important variable that represents 
interest expenses as well as non-interest expenses of the bank. As the interest expenses might 
be affected by the way the bank chooses to get deposits, then the bank may adjust the interest 
expenses to the general market rates. Consequently, total expenditure will capture the expense 
trade-off made by the bank (Rhoades, 1998).  
The next variable is the ratio of noninterest expenses (total operating costs / 
expenditure) to total assets. This represents expenses costs relative to personnel, back office 
and branches operations. This variable may capture any post-acquisition policy of cost 
reduction implemented by the new management team to improve performance and gain 
efficiency.  
The third variable is total expenses to total revenue and the fourth, non-interest 
expenses to adjusted operating revenue. Adjusted operating revenue can be defined as total 
interest income minus total interest expense plus non-interest income. However, total interest 
income minus total interest expense is equal to net interest income, so adjusted operating 
revenue becomes net interest incomes plus non-interest income, and those variables are 
provided by all SA banks annual reports. Using adjusted operating revenue as an alternative to 
ratios-based assets contains some advantages. First, the ratio total operating costs to total 
revenue is familiar to senior managers of top banks (Salomon Brothers, 1993); second, revenue 
as a denominator indicates the ability of the firm to generate revenue from its expenditures. 
Third, revenue gives an indication of rate changes, as assets Salomon don’t. And finally, for 
most banks, revenue indicates income earned off-balance sheet. Having both the assets ratio 
base and the revenue base variables can help provide good indications of efficiency.  
The last variable commonly used in the banking sector for efficiency is operating 
efficiency, which is defined as operating expenditure over operating income (operating 
revenue). Equally used is the sixth variable called index efficiency, which is defined as 
operating expenditure to net interest income.  
To measure performance, this study, like others (Izadi et al., 2019; Oradi & Izadi., 2019; 
Bourke et al., 2020; and Coccorese, and Ferri, 2020) adds onto the dataset two accounting 
indicators. First the rate of return on assets (ROA), is defined by the ratio of net income to 
average total assets showing how well the bank is capable of generating profits from its own 
assets. The second is the net income to equity (ROE) that measures the return to owners’ 
investment.  
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3.2 Study framework and hypothesis 
The study framework is characterised by an econometric model of T-Statistic test that identifies 
significant changes in means for the selected variables that were defined above. The purpose 
is not just comparing the performance and efficiency variables of ABSA and the SASD banks 
before and after change of their ownership structure, but it is also about analysing these results 
in a broader context by comparing these changes with their competitors, a control panel of 
similar banks, which are the FirstRand and Nedbank. The second characteristic of the study 
framework is the use of interviews, whose objective is to refine the quantitative analysis and 
understand better how knowledge transfer and spillovers effects may have taken place. 
 
3.3 Interview guide and meetings activities 
An interview guide (Annexe1) was designed and submitted to all selected representatives 
before meeting them. The interview guide served as a useful guideline for discussion and helps 
representatives in the elaboration of their answers. 
Interviews were conducted with representatives of the three big banks, SASD, 
FirstRand and Nedbank. For the 4th big four, ABSA representative was not available for an 
interview, he did however, return by email a succinct completed interview guide. It was not 
possible to organise any interview with both Barclays and ICBC banks. Meetings took place 
with several actors of the banking profession including management consultants, regulators 
and the competition Commission. The former Barclays lawyer who oversaw the acquisition, 
consumer financial institutions and other academics and practitioners took also part of the 
interviews. The majority of banks as well as the consultants were very cooperative. The outputs 
of all involved in the interview process were informative and helped understand the legislative, 
political and strategic context in which these foreign participations took place. The Banking 
Association and the South African Reserve Bank declined to cooperate on this aspect of foreign 
ownership.  
What was striking from these meetings is the high degree of consistency across 
consultants and competitors about the percieve benefits and non-benefits Barclays FDI 
provided to ABSA and the apparent lack of spillovers effects. However, our data analysis does 
not corroborate entirely their perception.  
 
3.4 T-Statistics model to provide changes in variables 
When searching for efficiency and performance improvement following ownership changes, 
several studies (Rhoades, 1998; Pazarskis, Charalampidou, Pantelidis, and Paschaloudis, 2014; 
and He, Kotharib, Xiaoc, Zuod, 2018), chose a period of three or five years preceding the 
change of ownership and three or five years after the change of ownership because half of the 
savings should be made during the first year and all savings would be achieved within three 
years. In addition, any cost savings or efficiency should be observable in public financial data 
such as annual reports. Therefore, this study selected a period of five year before and five year 
after a change of ownership to construct the dataset. 
A control group composed by the two remaining competitor banks was set up. First 
Rand and Nedbank are similar to ABSA and the Standard Bank in terms of size and location. 
The control group allows comparison with the study group (ABSA and the Standard Bank) and 
establishing a control group gives an indication of the nature of any observed changes in the 
study group.  
Finally, the methodology of T-Statistics is used. First, it compares the average means 
of variables before and after the event of majority or minority shareholding participation for 
each bank, ABSA and SASD, and second, it compares the average means of variables between 
the study group (ABSA and the Standard Bank) and the control group for the periods before 
and after the event of majority or minority change in ownership. For each variable for each 
bank of the sample over a five-year period before (year T-5, T-4, T-3, T-2 and T-1) and after 
(year T+1, T+2, T+3, T+4 and T+5) the acquisition event the mean is calculated from the sum 
of each bank indicator for years T-5, T-4, T-3, T-2 and T-1 and compared with the mean from 
years T+1, T+2 T+3 T+4, and T+5, respectively. The year (T=0) corresponds to the year when 
the event of ownership change occurred and is purposely omitted, because usually some 
additional costs, such as  acquisition transaction costs necessary for the deal (Healy et al., 
1992), are generated during the year of change in ownership and can influence the firms’ 
economic performance. The t-test equation is provided as follows: 
      
 
 = Number of variables 
 = Mean of pre-foreign participation (majority or minority) variables  
 = Mean of post-foreign participation (majority or minority) variables 
S = Standard deviation  
 = Group of pre-foreign (majority or minority) participation variables 
 = Group of post-foreign (majority or minority) participation variables 
 
The purpose of this study is to identify knowledge transfer and spillover effects in SA Banking 
sector consequently to two foreign (majority and minority) acquisitions. The assumption is that 
the efficiency and the performance of both ABSA (Barclays’ majority acquisition) and SBSA 
(ICBC minority participation) are greater during the period of post-acquisition, in the presence 
or not of the control group. To verify this assumption some hypotheses are established as 
followed: 
 
H1: It is expected to be a relative change in the defined variables after the event of a change 
in ownership structure for both banks ABSA and the Standard Bank. 
 
H2: It is expected to be a relative change with the defined variables after the event in ownership 
structure for the group study compared to the control group.   
 
Information collected from the interviews should contribute to explain the results of the 
t-statistics model.  
 
 
4. Interpretation of findings and further evidence 
 
4.1 Efficiency and transfer of knowledge 
The table 1 below reports the results of the t-statistic model for 6 variables on efficiency 
and 2 on performance for the ABSA and SASD before and after a change in the structure of 
their ownership due to foreign participation, and, all 6 indicators of efficiency are statistically 
significant, and decrease in value, which is equivalent to an increase in efficiency for both 
banks. This result suggests that significant cost cutting objectives were achieved within the 5-
year period after the change in two banks ownership structure. The variable, total expenses to 
total assets, is statistically significant as well as total expenses to total revenues leading to the 
conclusion that ABSA and SASD made significant cuts in both non-interest and interest 
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branches and transaction systems, while interest expenses relate to the way a bank get deposit. 
If a bank chooses to get funding from its core deposit, this will involve cots of retail offices 
and personnel at a relatively low interest expense. However, getting funding from the market 
using purchased money, will involve lower non-interest cost but higher interest expenses. From 
this it can be inferred that ABSA and the Standard Bank have similar cost reduction on interest 
expenses. Therefore, having a significant decrease in both total expenses variables strongly 
suggest that the two banks made a good trade-off in managing their decreasing total 
expenditure in particular interest expenses due to their access to cheaper money market.  
In addition, having both variables Total Expenses over Total Assets and Non-Interest 
Expenses over Adjusted Operation Revenues statistically significant for ABSA and SASD 
confirms the earlier suggestion of decrease in non-interest expenses. Furthermore, the ratios of 
operating efficiency and the index of efficiency are also both statistically significant confirming 
the assumption that a cost cutting programme was achieved for both banks. 
The real issue here is how to explain these sharp costs reduction for both banks, because 
understanding the programmes or schemes that generate increase efficiency and performance 
can help apprehend some very fundamental aspects of knowledge transfer. According to ABSA 
representative “ABSA benefited from Barclays’ systems” meaning that Barclays’ system 
migrated to ABSA and was implemented while processes and procedures were upgraded. 
Barclays confirms (Interview 4) “it benefited from Barclays’ products, management skills, 
procurement scale and policies”, and that could explain the decrease of non-interest expenses. 
In addition, we also assume that ABSA reduced its interest expenses, which means that it 
attracted deposits in a cheaper way. This might be explained, as earlier mentioned, from 
Barclays international exposure, which helped provide opportunity of more sources of funding 
as “ABSA benefited from Barclays strong global investment bank” (Interview 4).  
A reduction of non-interest expenses without cutting personnel costs was found to be 
particularly critical and challenging for ABSA, because professionals feedback indicated that 
keeping jobs at ABSA was one of the conditions of the acquisition. Although job loss does not 
explain alone transfer of knowledge, however, it is justified as a consequence of efficiency 
gained from the implementation of new systems and processes and by the improved 
performance as a result of costs reduction on personnel. But, this aspect of conditionality could 
not be verified from ABSA/Barclays or even from the SA Treasury and ABSA feedback 
(interview 4) explicitly refuted this deal condition by stated that ABSA did not lay off any 
personnel or put in place any voluntary redundancy policy. Nevertheless, the press (Mail & 
Guardian, 2012) revealed in 2011 and early 2012 that the new ABSA CEO, Maria Ramos had 
to make cuts in the bank’s costs. They reported that Ramos said, “this organisation is going to 
have to become more efficient, and I have to keep a close eye on costs while serving our 
customers better”. Union representative, Sasbo added “retrenchments were inevitable”. The 
same newspaper also added what an anonymous analyst said regarding job losses that “it’s 
concerning that there’s been such a high turnover of the top people”. Nonetheless, this turnover 
is not limited only to the top management but also to the entire organisation as reported: 
“Although Ramos is not talking about retrenchments but rather about restructuring, there has 
been a significant number of staffs leaving the bank because of unhappiness over regional 
departments being moved to and integrated with Johannesburg city centre offices”.  
In fact, aspects of job loss that were revealed in early 2012 from the media and 
professionals suggest that deliberate policies regarding efficiency might have been put in place 
well before this date and our figures show that in the ABSA case, there was a strong and 
significant improvement in efficiency five years after the event of acquisition, supporting the 
suggestion that a programme of cost reduction was not only implemented but also achieved 
thanks to transfer of knowledge from Barclays Bank the new ABSA owner
 
Table 1: T-Statistic (Two-tail) for the banks sample  
Source: Banks annual reports 
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An example of cost reduction at SASB was reported by the Financial Times (2010) that the 
bank operates a reduction of 2100 staff, three years after the event of minority participation 
took place. This may well be coincidental following the impacts of the 2008 financial crisis. 
The reason provided by the CEO to justify this redundancy policy was that the bank was losing 
in terms of revenues and ROE, and this is partly confirmed in table 1 showing a decrease in 
ROE but not statistically significant and no significant strong increase of ROA either. But 
given the context of having ICBC as a new shareholder it would be legitimate that ICBC 
suggested some costs reduction to justify at least any return on their very important investment 
($5 billion). Or similarly to ABSA, cost reduction at SASD could simply be the result of 
knowledge transfer from ICBC to SASD. To explain the strong gain in efficiency it is important 
to note that by contrast to ABSA/Barclays case, it is the SASB that offers an international 
exposure to ICBC through its advanced investment banking (Interview 3). Therefore, if SASB 
interest expenses policy is not influenced by ICBC, then we need to understand aspects of its 
non-interest expenses. 
         Table 2 below, displays an interesting element of the index efficiency for both banks. 
the impressive decrease, from 81% in T-3 to 67% in T-1 with an acceleration of the trend after 
the change in ownership to reach 60.84% in T+2 confirms a certain commitment of ABSA to 
cost cutting. Before 2005 the ABSA level of efficiency was around 70% on average against 
57% for SASB prior 2007, which represents a very good score, as it is close to 50% that is 
regarded as a benchmark in the profession and usually considered to be the maximum optimal 
ratio. Between the period T-3 and T+2, ABSA reduced its index of efficiency from 81% to 
60% with an important increase in T+4 and T+5 that correspond to years 2009 and 2010, two 
years after the global financial crisis.   
By contrast, the figures clearly suggest that Standard Bank had already a culture of 
keeping its costs down, a commitment to keep its non-interest expenses low even before the 
arrival of ICBC in its shareholding. Furthermore, despite the global financial crisis of 2008 
that occurred just one year after the minority ownership (2007), SASB succeeded in keeping 
its index efficiency at 62% on average over the 5 years (T+1 to T+5), a level close to the one 
before year 2007.  
 
Table 2: Value of Index efficiency for ABSA and the Standard Bank 
Bank Var. Before change in ownership (%) T
T=0 
After change in ownership (%) 


































































Source: Banks’ Annual reports, author calculation. IE is the Index Efficiency 
 
However, ICBC implemented its transaction card system at Standard bank to optimise some 
banking operations (Interview 3), which represents some transfer of knowledge from ICBC to 
SBSA, but there is no strong evidence of other types of knowledge transfer such as process, 
procedure and methods that could perhaps explain significant gain in efficiency at ICBC. In 
addition, SASD was not influenced by ICBC for any cost reduction scheme, which would 
allow us to speculate more on existence of more transfer of knowledge. Therefore, at this stage 
and in light of the results from tables 1 and 2 and the elements from the feedback at ABSA and 
interview at SASD we can conclude that majority ownership FDI (ABSA case) leads to 
significant increase in efficiency and knowledge transfer, whereas minority ownership FDI 
(SBSA case) can offer limited and non-significant transfer of knowledge . These findings are 
in line with Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) and Demelis and Louri (2002). 
Before analysing the two banks’ performance it is important to note (as already 
mentioned) that banks having similar level of revenues can generate different efficiency ratios 
and performances because of their respective business model. Assuming for instance that a 
bank puts more effort on customer service, this might lead to a lower efficiency but an 
improved net profit. Inversely, a bank that has a more tighter cost control policy may 
experience a higher efficiency ratio but may also have a lower profit margin. And this might 
well apply to ABSA and SASB in terms of ROA and ROE indicators. ROA indicator is not 
statistically significant for the two banks ABSA and SASD. While, ABSA experienced an 
increase of 9.5% on the two periods, in table 1, the Standard bank has a decrease of 14,5%. 
However, table 1 also shows that on average before the event of foreign participation the 
Standard bank ROA is 36% higher than that of ABSA and after it was still around 30% higher. 
ROE indicator is not statistically significant for any of the two banks. But the Standard bank 
shows a slightly better improvement than ABSA with 14% increase while ABSA decrease is 
about 3%, and both have similar level of ROE. What these figures of performance show is that 
minority or majority ownership FDI has no significant statistical impact on the performance 
indicators of banks, however, ABSA perform slightly better in terms of ROA between the two 
periods while SASB is marginally better in terms of ROE. It is not possible to conclude 
confidently that either Barclays or ICBC influence ABSA or SASD financial performance. 
After examining the efficiency and performance indicators of ABSA and SASB our 
results show that both banks made great effort to improve significantly their efficiency but less 
on their performance. Given the level of efficiency before its partnership with ICBC, it seems 
that SASB has developed a culture of keeping its costs down and could have represented some 
kind of benchmark for ABSA as indicators reached similar levels after the events of British 
ownership. The results for SASD may illustrate relationships management type between 
Standard Bank and the Chinese ICBC, which is described as smooth and translates into a 
mutual understanding. It does not seem that ICBC, unlike Barclays, which has a majority of 
ownership in ABSA, had a strong influence on Standard Bank strategy. We can then reiterate 
the fact in this case, minority FDI did not have great impact on financial results and despite 
having limited information systems transferred from ICBC to Standard Bank, knowledge 
transferred was not strategic enough to contribute to any form of efficiency improvement.  
Apparently, ABSA was committed to preserve jobs as part of the deal when negotiating 
the acquisition with the SA Treasury, and no explicit plan for redundancy was scheduled to be 
implemented. Although, in practice, ABSA did not cut any jobs, as some claimed, it had been 
however, freezing recruitment, and many unhappy staff left, which has contributed to keep 
staff costs under control. In addition, knowledge has been passed on from the mother foreign 
bank Barclays to its domestic subsidiary ABSA, and this enhanced ABSA efficiency 
significantly after Barclays became its main owner. This demonstrates that majority FDI 
contributed significantly to knowledge transfer that translates into tangible reduction of interest 




Evidence of competition and spillover effects 
The timescale of the two FDI events needs to be reminded again. The Barclays FDI occurred 
in 2005 and it was the first significant takeover in the SA banking sector since the end of the 
Apartheid regime and the ICBC foreign participation in SA came in 2007 two years after 
Barclays. This timescale raises some fundamental questions such as whether or not Barclays 
acquisition influenced competitors including the SASD, because the competitors could 
anticipate a more efficient ABSA after the announcement of the deal by Barclays and therefore 
expect the market to become more competitive. Thus, we could assume that Barclays 
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acquisition could triggered a more efficiency gain trend across the whole SA banking sector. 
But, the concomitance of other factors such as macro-economy or regulations cannot be 
ignored either.  Nonetheless, as the market could become more competitive, the banks would 
have no choice but to reduce their running costs and improve their efficiency in order to 
preserve their margins. So under competition pressure and in order to become more 
competitive and efficient, banks would upgrade their system and management practices as well 
as staff turnover between the new Barclays/ABSA entity and competitors. To explore the 
above assumption about competitors’ behaviour, we extended the previous investigation on 
efficiency and performance to competitors by looking at the performance and the efficiency 
indicators of ABSA and the Standard Bank in relation to their peers (control group) and the 
results are displayed in in table 3.  
This result suggesting a shift in ABSA strategy, influenced by its new owner Barclays 
that was acted by the competitors, is in line with what we stressed earlier that strategy and 
business model of a bank can lead to improved efficiency and low performance. Therefore, it 
is misleading to conclude that ABSA did not perform well but its weak performance of ROA 
and REO seemed not to be perceived as significant by competitors to encourage any change in 
their strategy. From this point of view, it seems that the Barclays’ acquisition was not a 
significant factor that could trigger yet direct competition in the SA banking sector.  
 
 
      Table 3: T-Statistic (Two-tail) for the banks sample compared to their peers 
Variables ABSA The Standard Bank 
Mean T-Statistics 
(Two-Tail) 
P-Value Mean T-Statistics 
(Two-Tail) 
P-Value 
Total Expenses over Total Assets 0.010 1.524 0.130* 0.003 0.540 0.600 
Total Expenses over Total Revenues 0.930 1.450 0.155* 0.654 1.389 0.170* 
Non-Interest Expenses over Total Assets 0.006 3.230 0.002*** 0.002 1.077 0.2882 
Non-Interest Expenses over Adjusted Operating Revenues 0.083 2.50 0.017** 0.017 0.63 0.526 
Operating Efficiency 0.273 2.743 0.009*** 0.202 2.57 0.014** 
Index Efficiency 0.042 0.966 0.340 0.034 1.908 0.064* 
ROA 0.822 3.000 0.005*** -0.160 -1.013 0.317 
ROE 0.114 0.027 0.978 -2.913 -1.156 0.254 
       Source: Banks annual reports, author calculation 
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Despite 
this perception of weak ROA and ROE of ABSA by the control panel, this result is in line 
with other findings from the literature showing that successful acquisition activities bring 
economic benefits from changes that increase business performance that would not have been 
generated without a change in control (Athianos et al, 2003; Pazarskis, 2008). However, 
merger & acquisitions studies show that acquisitions don’t necessary increase efficiency 
(Azarchs, 1995; Srinivasan, and Wall, 1992; Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Rhoades, 1993). 
This is not the case for ABSA, whose results show strong efficiency gains after the event of 
acquisition.  
                For the Standard Bank, table 3 shows that only 3 indicators of efficiency are 
statistically significant and the remaining 3 indicators show positive increase in efficiency but 
not statistically significant. However, these results suggest a better overall efficiency for the 
Standard Bank than the control group. In terms of ROA and ROE, none is significant, but they 
are positive translating a better performance than the competitors. In other words, Standard 
Bank globally performed better than its competitors and this confirms the trend of previous 
analysis.  
                 But the same question remains whether or not this ICBC minority FDI could 
influence SASB good performance. It wasn’t possible to get an answer directly from ICBC, 
but in light of some evidence, it is hard to completely rule out the possibility of an ICBC 
strategic influence. Feedback (Interview 3) from Standard Bank confirms that ICBC does not 
pressurise Standard Bank over getting better performance and the ICBC has only 20% of 
shareholding not to mention that it had only 2 seats on the Standard bank board. But, this level 
of ICBC shareholding in the Standard bank was a significant $5.6 billion investment. In 
addition, it would be interesting to understand the rational of the simultaneous activities of 
costs reduction and divestment if they were not influenced by ICBC. As earlier mentioned, 
Standard Bank cut 2100 staff in 2010 (Financial Times, 2010), the following year in 2011 it 
sold its 55% stake in the Standard Bank Argentina to ICBC, keeping a 20% shareholding and 
the right to board representation. That same year Standard Bank sold its 36.4% stake in Russia 
Troika Dialog and reduced its stake in Turkey’s Standard Unlu from 67% to 25% the 
following year in 2012. The objective of these diverse divestments in assets abroad and staff 
cuts, was to refocus its operations on the Africa continent and this immediately fuelled the 
speculation that ICBC wanted a higher return on its investment in Africa. Many in the SA 
banking sector including competitors and consultants, already thought that reinvesting in 
Africa would be seen as a legitimate request from ICBC. And indeed, the motivation of ICBC 
investment in Standard Bank could have been guided by its wishes to have a footprint on the 
African continent and this would clearly contribute to ICBC extension strategy. Therefore, 
with its presence in 18 African countries, Standard Bank became a good match to implement 
this expansion strategy (Interview3). This argument over ICBC encouraging Standard Bank 
operations to refocus on Africa was explicitly exposed to the Standard Bank representative 
(Interview 3), who provided the following approach:  
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Standard Bank had no competitive advantage in the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India 
and China excluding SA);  
1. Standard Bank was in a position to receive significant cash from local financial institutions 
for these assets; 
2. As the economic conditions and governance in African countries were improving and this 
represented potential growth in Africa. In addition, cash generated could increase Standard 
Bank’s ability to enhance its competitive advantage on the African continent where it already 
had an important presence. 
Furthermore, to reinforce this argument it was reported that the style of management of ICBC 
was not about imposing a strategy. Instead a harmonious relationship and mutual respect was 
established. Real effort was made for a post-deal cooperation to work at the operations level 
in establishing streams and workshops, and at the project level, where agreements are made 
with specific clients and projects. Ad hoc teams were built around these projects (Eidt, 2012).    
With 
ABSA strong performance and an efficiency gain on 3 indicators from the Standard bank 
compared to its competitors, and with the evidence showing Standard bank traditionally 
keeping its costs down, we could implicitly assume that the competitors too had implemented 
a cost-cutting strategy during the same period 2002-12. Feedback from the competitors 
confirmed the existence of such approach or strategy that took different shapes for Nedbank 
and First Rand.  
               Since 2003, Nedbank (Interview 6) implemented a Barrett Survey, a programme that 
was speeded up in 2005 after Barclays’ acquisition (but not amended because of Barclays 
FDI, as the programme was producing tangible results). This was initially not a response to 
Barclays’ acquisition but rather a process that was already in place, it was reported. This first 
component of the Barrett Survey was based on personnel development, team effectiveness, 
coaching, flexible work and life balance. The second component focused on market strategy, 
which consisted of cutting down their fees and targeting the higher segment of the market. 
For Nedbank the SA market landscape was changing because the population was becoming 
wealthier, they then decided to focus on this particular segment as the traditional one was 
becoming saturated and competition too high. This strategy was also implemented in the retail 
segment to potentially attract more customers. This argument is well supported as in early 
2000s, the regulator introduced Basel procedures and encouraged the banking sector to reduce 
its fees. Therefore, this Nedbank motives in rethinking its strategy in 2003 supports our 
assumption of possible gain in efficiency and increased performance before Barclays 
acquisition.  
               First Rand the second competitor, reviewed their strategy (Interview 5) started back 
in the late 90s following the re-entry of the foreign banks, and similarly to Nedbank, reducing 
fees was clearly one of the motives. To implement this strategy, First Rand started to invest 
massively in technology infrastructure, with the objective of putting in place new 
infrastructure platforms to reduce running operations costs in branches and transfer many of 
these operations to electronic transactions. The new infrastructure was composed by 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   




telephone banking and Internet. From this strategy, a direct consequence could be a significant 
reduction of personnel costs, which translated into efficiency gains.Therefore, all these 
elements contribute to explain why ABSA increased efficiency did not impress its competitors 
because they were already embarked in costs reduction programmes, well before Barclays 
acquisition.   
                    However, both competitors (Interviews 5 and 6) confessed that they feared for 
their investment banking activities as it became clear that ABSA investment banking was 
performing well. In fact, Barclays Capital, the investment banking of Barclays combined its 
investment banking teams with those of ABSA, and by working together, the new entity in 
investment banking became very competitive and created serious competition. Both 
competitors Nedbank and FirstRand reported to experience unusual turnover in their 
investment banking teams, and many of their employees left to the new ABSA/Barclays 
investment entity. This personnel turnover was so serious that both banks had to implemented 
staff retention scheme to incentivise their employees to stay or to return. First Rand in 
particular became anxious about Barclay card, a product that was expected to become 
available in the SA market, but Barclays never introduced this product in SA. Barclays/ABSA 
investment team was the only reported threat that Barclays FDI created in the SA banking 
sector according to feedback from the Nedbank and FirstRand.  
               According to some competitors another factor that influenced their strategy to 
become more efficient was the emergence of a new domestic player called Capitec, a new 
bank created in 2002 and labelled by one of the competitors (Interview 5) a “disruptor”. As 
shown on figure 2, Capitec experienced rapid and positive assets growth and operates in the 
lower segment of the market targeting low income-earners. Capitec operates mainly in the 
retail banking segment and offers small-unsecured loans to its customers. Capitec has a good 
understanding of microlending business and, risks linked to its banking activities are carefully 
managed. Furthermore, Capitec activities benefit from its well-developed information 
technology system and as a financial institution, it is supervised by the SARB. All these 
competencies and capabilities Capitec has been developing just over few years make it one of 
the main players in the SA microlending industry.  
 









Source: Banks’ Annual reports, author calculation 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Capitec is technology-driven banking organisation that is its main strength and represents a 
major threat to First Rand, which had also invested massively in technology infrastructures. 
Capitec technology-driven business model helps to service the low-income-earning 
customers. With an infrastructure that includes strong front-end information technology, 
paperless and cashless branches, it can operate efficiently and at low margin profits. Capitec 
electronic cards can be used in more than 200 of its own ATMs, as well as retailers’ 
distribution outlets with whom the banks have concluded business agreements. Being able to 
provide full banking products and services at the lowest costs give the bank an edge over some 
bigger competitors.   
 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper serves to examine the mechanism of knowledge transfer and the channels of 
spillover effects (knowledge spillover) from two FDIs in the SA banking sector through the 
lens of efficiency gain and performance improvement corroborated with explanatory evidence 
taken from interview outputs of most players in the SA banking sector such as the SA big four 
banks, management consultants and other financial and regulatory institutions. This article 
also distinguishes between minority and majority FDIs to analyse their respective impacts on 
knowledge transfer.  
              The results show that five years after Barclays’ foreign acquisition, ABSA displayed 
strong efficiency gains as all variables are statistically significant, but none of performance 
indicators, ROA and ROE, is significant despite positive increase in ROA. Compared to its 
competitors, ABSA shows strong efficiency gain for 5 of its 6 indicators, which are also 
statistically significant. However, ROA and ROE indicators suggest that ABSA does not 
outperform the control group in particularly with a negative ROA indicator that is statistically 
significant. Similarly, Standard Bank shows some significant efficiency gains five years after 
ICBC foreign participation in its ownership structure and its performance indicators do not 
demonstrate any significant improvement. Compared to control group Standard bank shows 
improved ROA and ROE, which are not statistically significant. Its efficiency gain is 
significant for 3 of its 6 indicators.  
                The study finds that some demonstration effect, which is characterised by the 
introduction and adoption of new system, techniques, procedure and new management 
practice that potentially provided efficiency gain to the whole banking sector, was not 
necessarily attributed to Barclays or ICBC FDIs. Instead the factors responsible for the 
demonstration effect were attributed to the re-entry of foreign banks in the late 90s, the 
introduction of new SA government regulation and policy.  
             Another lesson from this study is that despite Barclays acquisition failed to impress 
the control group, this FDI triggered some competition effects in segment of investment 
banking characterised by a high level of staff turnover between the new Barclays/ABSA entity 
and the control group. However, the timescale of the study could not allow us to demonstrate 
if these knowledges were used or replicated when staff moved to their new employers or move 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   




back to their former employers. Moreover, more aspects of competition effect seemed to 
emerge in the segment of retail bank not because of the two FDIs, but thanks to a new player 
Capitec, whose business model is based on new technology that usually contribute to operate 
at low profit margin and high efficiency. This case study shows the complexity of analysing 
the multiple layers of the mechanisms of spillover effects over a period of time, and despite 
the presence of some channels of spillover effects, it wouldn’t confidently conclude on 
spillover effects as a direct consequence of minority and majority FDIs. But instead, a 
combination of the re-entry of foreign banks in early 2000s, successive influence of 
government policies and those two FDIs were responsible for an overall spillover effects in 
the SA banking sector. Nevertheless, this study does confirm, the existence of strong 
knowledge transfer from Barclays to ABSA, as a result of majority FDI. For ICBC minority 
FDI there is some limited evidence of knowledge transfer to the Standard Bank, which did no 
have any significant impact on efficiency and performance, however, there is evidence of real 
shift of Standard bank strategy very likely to have been influenced by ICBC. 
This study is very useful for many different reasons. First it contributes to the scarce existing 
literature and demonstrates how FDI produce positive effects on competition and efficiency 
gain, as the entry of foreign banks in emerging markets may contribute to increase competition 
and improve the level of efficiency of domestic banks through lower costs and interest margin 
(Lensink and Hermes, 2004). More recent study by Arezki and Liu (2020) investigate growth 
spillovers between emerging markets (EMs) and advanced economies (AEs). Their result 
indicate the size of the spillovers running from EMs to AEs is about a fifth of these running 
from AEs to EMs. In addition, while the literature on majority and minority FDI is well 
developed in the industry sector, in the banking sector, the literature often distinguishes 
amongst foreign, domestic, private and state ownerships, and only few examine majority and 
minority FDI such as works of Hagmayr and Haiss (2006); Genfu, (2013); and Li, Li, Lei and 
Huang (2015) for instance. Therefore, our study provides a significant contribution in 
examining aspects of ownership and confirms that majority ownership in the banking sector 
may provide more channels of spillovers effects than minority FDI. Our results are in line 
with those of Blomstrom and Sjohalm (1999), Papi and Revoltella (1999) and Demelis and 
Louri (2002) who find that majority shareholding leads to efficiency, more productivity and 
therefore knowledge spillovers, but not with those who find that minority FDI is associated 
with significant increase of efficiency (Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2007; Laurenceson and Qin, 
2008; Chunxia, Yao, Shujie and Feng, Genfu, 2013; Li, Li, Lei and Huang, 2015). And finally, 
the work confirms that minority and majority FDIs are sources of knowledge transfer but at 
different degrees showing that mother banks provide direct transfer of management skills, 
systems and practices that ensure competitiveness of their subsidiaries (Uiboupin, 2005).  
The last contribution of our study is about policy making following the Barclays divestment 
in ABSA in 2017, 12 years after acquiring a majority share in ABSA. In a globalisation 
context of the emerging markets such as SA and intense internationalisation of SA banks this 
may become a concern for policy makers and government. One of these concerns is the cut 
and run, a foreign banks tendency to leave the market in times of economic downturn and 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
political crisis. It may well be that the 2008 global financial crisis and the change of leadership 
at Barclays that followed may have had an impact on the decision of Barclays to disinvest in 
ABSA. Maybe further research needs to investigate the impacts on ABSA after such event. A 
consequence of the cut and run strategy is the possibility of triggering risks for financial 
stability as well as a decrease of private sector credits. This study should contribute to a more 
detail understanding of the impacts and risks associated to different ownership levels when 
policy makers have to decide about new FDI and their impacts to the whole banking sector 
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